(by country and date of establishment of first expon processing facilities) 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980- fifty-seven zones in twenty-nine countries. By the mid-eighties there were seventynine zones in thirty-five countries, with substantia1 assemb1y activity occurring outside designated zones as well (Currie, 1984) . Asia accounts for over ha1f (55 percent) of the world's zone emp1oyment;
Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central
America about 30 percent (with Mexico representing over ha1f of that amount);
South America (Brazil, Colombia, and Chile) about 8 percent; and Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Midd1e East account for the small remainder (see fig. 2 ).
The main products are e1ectronics-both consumer goods and components-texti1es, appare1, and footwear (see fig. 3 ). Source: Currie (1984) , except as noted.
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Figure 2
PRINCIPAL HOST COUNTRIES, 1978 to 1983 (by continent and amount of employment in expon processing)
'Mexican data from Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (SPP). 2Does not include several small East Caribbean islands. 3Dominican Republic date from the National Council of Industrial Free Zones, reported in Thoumi (1988) . 1978 1983 1978 1983 1978 1983 Asia (except Hong Kong) 16% 15% 45% 33% 39% 53% Source: Based on data from Currie (1984) , Table 4 , p. 24, which are aggregated from individual zone level data for twenty-three countries.
lBased on all reporting finns.
A. Corporate Strategy
The rise of international assembly in the late sixties was not an isolated curiosity. Rather, it was a bell weather event evidencing a deep-seated change in the global political economy which many authors refer to as the "new in terna tion al division of labor" (e.g., Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Frobels, Heinrich, and Kreye, 1980; Moulaert and Salinas, 1983) . The rise of global assembly reflected the decline of U.S. corporate hegemony in the world economy, the rise of foreign http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/tpla/8905.pdf Patricia A. Wilson The Global Assembly Industry competition, and the search for new competitive strategies. In the face of the rising foreign competition, U.S.-based multinational corporations had two broad strategy choices: to improve productivity or to reduce costs.S On a national level, workers' wage increases were beginning to outpace diminishing productivity gains.
Many corporations chose a cost-reduction strategy focusing on labor costs. Third
World countries that offered cheap, plentiful (and female6) labor became very attractive locations-not as an access point to the local market, but as a site for carrymg out labor intensive processing of goods destined for the international market. Thus, as textile, garment, shoe, and toy production went offshore along with the assembly of electronic components and electronic consumer goods, the new international division of labor was born.' It seemed to reflect the pinnacle of mass production rationality carried to an international scale (see Wilson, 1989) .8
Among developed countries, U.S.-based multinationals were the primary ones to pursue the global assembly strategy. A lack of protectionist sentiment at home made offshore sourcing politically feasible. Existing U.S. tariff codes (Items 806 and 807) provided a tax incentive by allowing the U.S. components in the assembled products to be reimported duty free.
European multinationals did not face the same pressures as U.S. corporations to reduce costs because of tariff barriers helping to protect the European community from foreign competition. Moreover, European producers had access to large pools of cheap migrant labor without going offshore. There were also lower labor cost countries within Europe-Ireland, Portugal, Spain-that served as assembly sites for some industries. Nevertheless, the Europeans did have a presence in the global assembly industry-primarily in North Africa and the Mediterranean.
Japanese corporations carved out their comparative advantage largely on the basis of productivity increases stemming from the introduction of flexible manufacturing-not just new technology, but new management methods and shop floor organization, along with an emphasis on quality (see Wilson, 1989 did. Yet, like the Europeans, the Japanese did have a presence in the global assembly industry--especially in Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia. In fact, by the end of the 1970s their investment in electronics manufacturing in east Asia was growing rapidly, even though most of it was aimed at regional or third-party markets and consisted of older technologies (Grunwald and Flamm, 1985) .
B. Sectoral Patterns
Improvements in international communication and transportation made a global production strategy feasible for certain products and industries: those with high value-to-weight ratios such as textiles (including garrnents) and electronic components. Electronic component assembly was the first U.S. industry to go offshore en masse in response to Japanese competition. The feasibility of offshore locations for electronics carne about with the development of integrated circuits etched on silicon chips in the late sixties.9 While the manufacture of the chips was capital intensive, their assembly and encapsulation were not. Given the high value-to-weight ratios and improvements in air transport and telecommunications, the labor intensive portion could be geographically separatedlO U.S. producers of electronic consumer goods-radios, tape recorders, televisions-also began to locate their labor intensive assembly operations abroad in the face of Japanese competition. Television components and subassemblies became the second largest 806/807 import to the U.S. from developing countries after semiconductors (Grunwald and Flamm, 1985, p. 18 to increase worker productivity, not by bringing in cheap labor through migrant flows from the Third World (although this indeed has been increasing; see Sassen, 1988) , but rather by going offshore to Third World locations. Compared to the primary Japanese strategy of increasing long-terrn productivity by adopting flexible manufacturing methods, the predominant U.S. strategy of labor cost cutting was a short-terrn one. This pattern reflected, and in fact exacerbated, dedining U.S.
economic hegemony (see Wilson, April 1989) .
C. Geographic Patterns
If the global assembly industry is following a natural pattem of spreading to ever cheaper labor countries, as the product cyde theorists presume, why is it that so many developing countries have been passed over? The bulk of foreign assembly activity (about 87 percent) is concentrated in east and southeast Asia, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Figure 2 shows that the regional percentages have scarcely changed over time (although individual country shares within regions have). The city-state then adopted a full-fledged national strategy of export-oriented industrialization based on foreign assembly industry. It improved the roads, public utilities, telecommunications networks, and airports; it built an industrial estate with nearby public housing; it enacted tax incentives and investment guarantees for foreign investors (Griffith, 1987) . But the central girder to their efforts was to control the labor force: "the government believed that the success of the (export) industrialization prograrnmes rested on low wages and a disciplined work-force" (Chen, 1983, p. 12) . In 1968 the government passed laws to increase the work week, to reduce vacation, sick leave, and eligibility for overtime pay, and to remove a broad range of labor issues from collective bargaining.
In that same year Singapore attracted its first electronics corporation, the semiconductor industry leader Fairchild'4 (see figA). The ensuing wave of foreign investrnent created such growth in Singapore that in 1971 the government rescinded the tax holidays for foreign corporations (Chang, 1971, p. 41) . While a late starter in the global assembly industry, by 1971 Singapore had the largest share of semiconductor assembly in Asia.
Taiwan.By the end of fifty years of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Taiwan had developed a light industrial base along with some heavy industries such as aluminum, chemicals, and shipbuilding-largely through investments by leading Japanese family groups (Ho, cited in Cumings, 1984, p. 13 Japan (Cumings, 1984, pp. 15-22) . U.S. aid missions assisted Taiwan's national planning efforts for agricultural and industrial development.
The KMT-with at least tacit approval if not always active support by the U.S.
aid missions-adopted an import substitution strategy. The government used protective tariffs and overvalued exchange rates to nUrture selected industries such as textiles, cement, and glass. Forging a strong link between the state and the private sector, the KMT granted monopolies to favored entrepreneurs, usually mainlanders, who took over industries formerly held by Japanese family groups.
After the peak of easy import substitution in 1958/1959, the government opted for an export-led strategy to utilize Taiwan's comparative advantage of cheap, yet educated, labor. While this strategic change from import substitution to export orientation has occurred at great social expense and political upheaval in Latin America, it happened quickly and easily in Taiwan.
To implement the export-led strategy, the Taiwan government in 1960 devalued the currency to cheapen exports (and the labor used to make the exports), reduced tariff barriers, created tax incentives for exporters, and provided state guarantees to protect foreign investments. In 1965 Taiwan opened an export processing zone at Kaohsiung to further attract multinational assembly plants. These steps were taken in the context of long-range planning by the state. to future bureaucrats and corporate managers (Cumings, 1984, pp. 22-26) . China's social upheavals produced an influx into Hong Kong of capital, entrepreneurs, and skilled workers, especially in the textil e industry, which further set the stage for manufactured exports.
With the absence of minimum wage regulations and scant union activity, foreign capital was already finding Hong Kong a haven for export processing by the late 1950s (Fajnzylber, 1981, pp. 121, 126; Lin and Ho, 1980, p. 11, cited in Fajnzylber, 1981 (Henderson, 1989, p. 136) .
The government played an important role in the economy, but one that was largely supportive of the needs of private capital, for example, by subsidizing the private cost of labor through free public training, welfare payments, and subsidized housing (Taylor and Kwok, 1989) .
Latin America and the Caribbean. In light of Latin America's experience with import substitution, the question becomes not why was so much of Latin America passed over by the international assembly industry, but rather, why did the international assembly industry come to Latin America at all? One could also ask, in light of the social and political relations of import substitution in Latin America, why did any of these countries even try to attract an industry built on cheap, disciplined labor with few domestic linkages?
First, with the exception of Puerto Rico and Haiti, none of the initial efforts to attract assembly industry in Latin America was part of a full-fledged effort to promote a national strategy of export manufacturing18 Second, the efforts that were made were small, involve relatively few countries in Latin America, and usually originated as a development strategy for a particular region-an undeveloped region (e.g., Manaus in the Brazilian Amazon)/9 a labor surplus region (e.g., Mexico's northern border region after the U.S. halted the Bracero program for Mexican farmworkers), or a geopolitically strategic region (e.g., Iquique and Punta Arenas in the northern and southern border zones of Chile). In each case the export processing efforts were tangential to an overall import substitution strategy. Even the tiny Caribbean nations (except Haiti) that pursued assembly forms continued to depend on either raw material exports or import substitution for the mainstay of their economy (see fig. 5 ).
What prompted foreign investors to set up assembly industries in Latin fig. 4 ).20
Haiti was a clear departure frem the Latin American nonn of import substitution and labor mobilization. while annual construction growth topped thirteen percent (Garrity, 1974, p. 208) .
Assembly industry continued to grow in Haiti until the early 1980s, when social and political unrest could no longer be contained. "Baby Doc" was overthrown in 1986.22
Thus, with few exceptions, the difference in social relations attendant upon import substituting industrialization in Latin America and Asia was the main reason why Latin America has played such a small role in the international assembly industry and Asia such a large one. As Ruth Pearson (1986, p. 74 ) aptIy states, Latin American industrialization strategy represented a different political project from that pursued in SE Asia: a poli tic al project which has seen organized labor play a major roleo Although this often resulted in the defeat of the labor movement-frequentIy via the intervention and repression of the military-it never wiped out the tradition of the organized industrial working class in Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, which was based on the expansion of domestic industry. . . . 
LINKAGES

A. The Extent of Local Linkages in the Asian Tigers
From the host country's point of view, the viability of an export-led development strategy based on the assembly industry depends on the extent to which the industry can create beneficial links with the host economy in addition to the direct employment and foreign exchange generated. Probably the single most important link is known as "backward linkages' (Hirschman, 1958) , that is, the degree to which national inputs are used in the production process.2J The nature of assembly industry-based as it is on the importation of components, the use of cheap labor to perform the assembly "service," and the reexport of the final products-has justified its being dubbed an "enclave" in much of the literature (Kindleberger, 1968) .24 Source: Compiled from Spinanger (1984, p. 79) , using data provided by export processing zones (three-year floating averages used; Singapore data include purchases from other EPZ firms in the country as domestic inputs). Not only have the four newly industrializing countries of Asia been able to develop domestic suppliers for the foreign assembly plants, they have created some domestic industries that are competitive with the foreign firms. In Taiwan, for example, foreign electronics assembly helped spawn a domestic electronics industry making computer clones for the world market (Spinanger, 1984, p. 84) . Taiwan is also producing its own telecommunications equipment, precision machinery, optical instruments, and biotechnology. South Korea is well known for its production of consumer durable s for the international market. Hong Kong's locally owned semiconductor firms have moved beyond subcontract assembly into advanced circuit testing and wafer manufacturing (Henderson, 1989, pp. 140-141) .
With the local supplier base growing and wages rising (see fig. 8 ), assembly plants in all four countries have been upgrading to higher technology products and processes, in which labor costs make up just a small part (Henderson, 1989, p. 126 Hong Kong-not so much to reduce labor costs as to improve quality control-while at the same time shifting some production to Malaysia (the firrn also tried manufacturing in the U.S., but found the labor force "insufficientIy versatile") (Currie, 1984, p. 30 A number of scho1ars have concluded-sometimes re1uctant1y-that while assemb1y industry in the Asian tigers started off as typica1 enclaves, it eventually estab1ished backward linkages to the firms in the host country (e.g., Schive, 1988) .
These IIsuccess stories" have prompted some economists to genera1ize a pattern:
'''First-stage' internationa1 sourcing within a divisible production process-such as the 10cation of semiconductor or te1evision assemb1y in a deve10ping country-then gives rise to 'second-stage' internationa1 sourcing-the transfer to the deve10ping country of input production as well" (Lim and Pang, 1982, p. 591 ). Source: Compiled from Currie (1984) , p. 38, for first three, and fig. 7 above for 1ast three countries.
In most other countries with export processing, however, domestic linkages have remained small, including in other Asian countries (see fig. 9 ).29 Mexico's assembly industry shows no trend toward increasing its current 1.5 percent share of domestic content (Wilson,forthcoming) . In the Dominican Republic, which has overtaken Haiti as the leading export processing country in the Caribbean, the use of local inputs also remains very small (Thoumi, 1988) .
B. Historical Factors
What Third, maSSlve U.S. foreign aid helped finance local industrial development.
From 1946 to 1978, South Korea alone received nearly $6 billion in U.S. economic grants and loans, compared to less than $15 billion for all of Latin America during the same years (Cumings, 1984, p. 24 In the mid-seventies the U.S. began to apply "orderly marketing agreements" and "voluntary export restraints," which took on the nature of protective tariffs and quotas (Fajnzylber, 1981, p. 129 ).
c. Role of the State
Latin American countries trying to get on the export-led bandwagon face major obstacles: a detrimental legacy of social relations accompanying import substitution (see Section 11, above), increased protectionism by the advanced countries, and not just a lack of financial capital but massive foreign debt.
Despite the differing historical conditions that make an easy transfer of the Asian "lessons" to Latin America impossible, there were some public policies the Asian four pursued to build upon their assembly industry that perhaps have some possibility of replicability in Mexico and other Latin American countries today.
First, all four countries used assembly manufacturing as a stepping stone-a transitory device-toward a full export-led industrialization.
In three of the four-Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore--export processing was part of a shift in national cornmitment from an inward-oriented development strategy to an outward-oriented one. None of the four adopted export processing primarily as a regional development strategy. Those that at first confined their export processing to specified zones, later began to offer nationwide incentives to foreign investors.
They began to allow custom-free treatment even to firms that sold part of their product on the domestic market, just to gain access to more foreign exchange and technology (Currie, 1983) . Victor Sit (1988) describes this trend for Taiwan:
With the rapid expansion of its exporting sector and the gradual creation of numerous well-planned industrial areas and districts throughout the island, the significance of the EPZs in Taiwan (Koh, 1987, p. 25) , the government guides foreign investment by tying incentives to particular behaviors such as investing in priority sectors, upgrading capital intensitivity, or undertaking on-site R&D.
Thus, the Asian experience shows that export-led industrialization does not require a small role for the state, an end to import substitution, or total submission to foreign capital. In other words, to pursue a role in the new global economy, Third World countries need not convert themselves into "passive objects of international market forces" (Fajnzylber, p. 122) . On the contrary, to forge domes tic linkages from foreign assembly industry and lay the basis for a full-fledged export-oriented industrialization, the Asian tigers (at least three out of four) did quite the opposite: maintained a central role for the state in guiding the economy, pursued a deepening of import substitution, and kept foreign capital within the boundaries of national interest.
IV. NEW TRENDS A. Social Unrest in the Asian Tigers
There are no "happily ever after" stories in the dialectical play of history. The main factor contributing to the stable growth of export-oriented industrialization in the four Asian tigers may have become the undoing of that stability: the "disciplining" of the labor force. Social umest in the Asian tigers is now rampant.
The labor force is no longer passive. Even in comparatively tame Hong Kong, popular pressure on the government since 1982 has risen to an "unprecedented level" (Lo, 1988, p. 613 Tae-Woo into "an extremely delicate balancing act" (Neff and Nakarmi, 1989, p. 39) . In Taiwan the lifting of martial law in mid-1987 unleashed labor strife in the textiles, electronics, auto, and paper industries.
Labor shortages have become a problem, particularly in lower wage industries, in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Singapore (Yang and Nakarmi, 1989, p. 46) . The ruling party in Korea is reportedly hoping for a strong recession to put labor back in its place, since the government has been unable to do so (Neff and Nakarmi, 1989, p. 39) .
B. China's Entry into Global Assembly Industry
With labor unrest, wages, and labor shortages mounting In the four Asian tigers, the People's Republic of China-with the lowest wages in East Asia, no strikes, and a potentially huge internal market-has become attractive to foreign Investments in infrastructure (roads, factories, commercial, tourist, and residential construction, telecommunications, energy) have transformed the area out of all recognition. . .. The technicians and managers from Hong Kong, Japan, Europe, and the U.S. are very much encouraged to pass on their skills and to some extent their techniques to the local Chinese, at all levels. Large numbers of Chinese from other parts of the country have come to Shenzhen to put their skills to use and to upgrade these skills through contact with the new industries. . .. The creation of the SEZ has stimulated the establishment of a new university at Shenzhen, geared to the practical needs of the zone (Sklair, 1986, pp. 8-9 ).
On the other hand, Chu (1987) (Long, 1986) .
In 1980 Trinidad and Tobago also shifted to an export-led strategy, but one based on their natural resources rather than their cheap labor. The government opened the Point Lisas Industrial Estate offering the usual import duty exemptions on raw material s and machinery. But they pursued export-oriented chemical and steel industries, rather than traditional assembly. At Point Lisas, small locally owned firms in fertilizers, plastics, and sports equipment predominate in number.
They are labor intensive with simple technology. The large firms, however, account for most of the employment. The huge capital intensive firms in petrochemicals, iron, and steel, account for the bulk of the employment. They make fertilizer, nitrogen, ammonia, methanol, urea, and steel for the export market.
Over half of the large firms are totally state-owned, a third are joint ventures between the state and foreign corporations (with 51 percent state capital), and the remainder are totally foreign-owned. Many of the smaller firms are actually spin-offs of the large ones, have been created under licensing arrangements and turn-key contracts with the foreign corporations. There are no textile and electronic firms at Point Lisas. While Point Lisas accounts for less than 1 percent of total national employment, its exports have overtaken sugar as the second largest source of foreign exchange after mineral fuel lubricants (Long, 1986 ).
Mexico, too, entered a new phase of its assembly industry in the 1980s. The industry grew beyond a regional development strategy to gain national importance after the government adopted a full-fledged export-led strategy in 1982. Two significant trends altered the nature of assembly industry in Mexico during the 1980s: the rise of higher value-added manufacturing and the adoption of flexible manufacturing methods in a significant portion of the maquiladoras (see Wilson, 1989 ). Yet Mexico has not been able to take much advantage of these trends to create local supplier linkages. Like China after ten years, Mexico after twentyfive years has not been able to follow the path of the Asian tigers. Mexico's assembly workers have shown willingness and ability to adopt the new shop floor methods of flexible manufacturing (see discussion in Wilson, 1989) .
These new methods involving labor-management cooperation have generated resistance among U.S. unions.37 Taiwanese workers are reportedly too accustomed to authoritarian militaristic discipline on the factory floor to be able to participate freely in labor-management quality circles.38 Foreign factory managers in China have found it hard to increase productivity and quality standards among workers accustomed to guaranteed jobs in state-owned factories (Chu, 1987) . In Latin America, Caribbean export manufacturing remains concentrated in routine assembly and is highly dependent on U.S. quotas and tax incentives. Thus, Mexico may be left with a rich opportunity to garner a larger role in leading-edge flexible manufacturing for exporto However, initial evidence indicates that it may be even more difficult for Mexico to create local linkage from flexible manufacturing than from more traditional industry (Wilson, 1989 (Washington, D.C.) for financing this study.
2. A similar argument can be made with respect to "natural" shifts in comparative advantage (Balassa, 1979) .
3. The literature on export processing often ignores the U.S. commonwealth country of Puerto Rico as an early example because of its uniqueness. As part of the export-oriented industrialization strategy of Operation Bootstrap, promulgated in the 1950s to develop the island's economy, the Mayaguez industrial zone was built and inaugurated in 1962. Virtually the entire island had duty-free access to U.S. markets, however, and Mayaguez offered few additional incentives.
Rising wage rates (Puerto Rico is subject to U.S. minimum wage laws) eroded the island's attractiveness for export processing, and now the government of Puerto Rico is attempting to garner a twin plant role of higher value-added activity with respect to the rest of the Caribbean.
4. The Shannon expon processing zone was created by the government of Ireland in the 1950s in response to the decline of the Shannon intemational airport as a refueling point for intercontinental air travel.
To pursue industrial development, the government realized that the restricted size of Ireland's internal market and its basically agrarian economy necessitated an export-oriented strategy. Ireland's new Industrial Development Authority built the infrastructure for the Shannon industrial zone and marketed it to foreign producers interested in a lowtax, low-labor-cost production site with access to the European market. Wage rates have become high enough now that the development authority is seeking high-technology manufacturing for reexporto (From a speech by Tony Shiels, Industrial Development Authority of Ireland, June 1989, in San Juan, Puerto Rico.) 5. Robert Reich (1983) points out a third strategy often followed: restructuring through mergers and acquisitions to maintain paper profit levels.
6. Ruth Pearson (1986) argues that women were particularly sought, not because they are universally dexterous and docile workers, but because working-class women are almost universally socialized to be dexterous and docile and therefore better suited than men to the fine work of component assembly and stitching. She also argues that the supply of low-wage women workers in the U.S. was declining, thus motivating the move to Third World countries.
See also Nash and Safa (1985) , Nash and Fernandez-Kelly (1983) , and Femandez-Kelly (1983) . Sklair (1989) adds that "docile, undemanding, nimble-fingered, nonunion, and unmilitant workers will be offered the jobs on the global assembly lines, while aggressive, demanding, clumsy, union, and militant workers will not," regardless of sex as soon as employers overcome their stereotypes and find out that women do not have a monopoly on the desired qualities (p. 172).
7. This intemational strategy was not limited to assembly, but also included higher value-added manufacturing.
The U.S. automobile industry became the 7. This internationa1 strategy was not 1imited to assemb1y, but a1so inc1uded higher va1ue-added manufacturing.
The U.S. automobile industry became the 1eader of this global manufacturing strategy with Ford's "world car" concept of the ear1y 1980s. The concept was ultimate1y abandoned in the mid-1980s.
8. For workers in advanced countries, the new internationa1 division of labor signa1ed the weakening of organized labor and the 10ss of jobs and real income. It meant the demise of the big capita1/big labor alliance in which workers had been dealt an expanding share of an expanding pie.
It meant dec1ining productivity as corporations pursued strategies that did not increase productivity but simp1y reduced costs. On a pub1ic po1icy 1eve1, the new internationa1 division of labor accompanied supp1y side economics, fiscal austerity, measures to dea1 with protectionist back1ashes, and a general weakening of the first world nation state's abi1ity to control capital flows.
9. Grunwa1d and Flamm (1985) point to an earlier beginning of offshore e1ectronic component production: transistor assemb1y in the ear1y 1960s. Faced with competition from cheap Japanese transistors (Japanese wage rates at the time were much 10wer than U.S. wages), U.S. producers followed the lead of the Fairchild Corporation, which set up a transistor assemb1y operation for the U.S. market in Hong Kong in 1961 in order to take advantage of wage rates 10wer than those in Japan.
10. The alternative of automating component assemb1y was rejected because of the rapid pace of techno10gica1 change in the fie1d and the short 1ife span of new products (product obso1escence), which made investment in costIy single purpose machinery unattractive.
Flexible automation (Le., the use of programmab1e machinery capab1e of responding rapid1y to changes in product design) cou1d have been attractive, but was not well known at the time, particu1ar1y among U.S. manufacturers (see Wi1son, 1989) .
11. Ironically, in response to "vo1untary" import quotas set up by the U.S. in the mid-seventies, Japanese te1evision manufacturers began to set up assemb1y p1ants in the U.S., bringing in components from Japan and deve10ping countries.
12. The Internationa1 Multi-Fiber Agreement promu1gated by the U.S. set quotas on texti1e and appare1 imports that stifled the growth of Mexican and Caribbean assemb1y operations in these sectors during the 1970s.
13. Examp1es of pub1ic enterprises created in pursuit of import substituting industria1ization inc1ude e1ectricity generation and distribution, iron and stee1, housing, transportation, food distribution, and even foreign exchange generating enterprises such as mining and petro1eum to ensure a steady supp1y of dollars with which to import the necessary industrial inputs and techno10gies.
14. Fairchi1d, which a1ready had p1ants in Hong Kong and Korea, 10cated in Singapore primari1y to spread its offshore country risk, rather than to seek 10wer wage rates, according to Chang (1971) .
15. The Kuomintang was composed of Chinese nationa1ist main1anders, 1ed by Chiang Kai-chek, who had fled to Taiwan after being defeated by the Communist arrny of Mao TseTung in 1949. The refugees from main1and China-1ike the Cubans in Miami after the Cuban Revolution-included a high proportion of entrepreneurs, professionals, and educated workers.
16. Note the stark contrast between this 1961 military coup in Korea aimed at instituting an export-led strategy with the military coup in Peru at the same time that was aimed at implementing import substitution. While the U.S. was actively supporting modernization strategies in Latin America based on import substitution at this time (through the Alliance for Progress program), Cumings claims that in both Korea and Taiwan the U.S. was actively promoting the switch to export-led industrialízation (p. 27).
17. Researchers have since shown that workers' eamings in Hong Kong's manufacturing industry did not keep up with labor productivity increases through the sixties and seventies (Glasmeier, 1989, p. 6) .
18. Colombia may also be considered an exception. The government converted several cornmercial free trade zones to export processing zones in the early 1970s as part of an export-oriented strategy. While Colombia has generated a substantial export-oriented manufacturing sector, líule of it is due to the zones. Currie speculates that the zones were used mainly as a way to avoid duties on imported input s by domestic firms selling to the domestic market. (p. 16).
19. The Bataan Export Processing Zone in the Philippines is another example of using assembly industry to develop an undeveloped region. This isolated zone was built in 1969, not as part of a national export-oriented strategy, but as a highly targeted regional development strategy in a country rife with regional, ethnic, and class umest. 20. U.S. Tariff Items 806/807 may have influenced some firms to locate in Mexico, as opposed to farther away, because of the preferential tax treatment-beyond host country incentives-given to U.S.-made components that were more easily accessible from Mexico. Ruiz and Tiano (1987) argue that the presence of a large pool of young, unemployed women, many unsupported and with dependents of their own, has attracted assembly plants to the northem border of Mexico. 21. In 1987 Haiti remained the lowest-wage nation in the Caribbean. The wage rate was less than two-thirds that of the Dominican Republic: 38 cents an hour compared to 61 cents an hour (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, No. 1, 1987, p. 17.) 22. The only other sizable location for assembly processing in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s was Manaus, the one-time fashionable and thriving free port in a remote section of the Amazon River in Brazil.
Established in 1968, the Manaus Export Processing Zone had over two hundred manufacturers at the end of 1983, mainly in electronic and electrical appliances (calculators, color televisions, electric typewriters) and mainly from Japan and Europe. The average wage for unskilled workers in Manaus in 1983 was U.S. $.70 to $.80 per hour (Currie, p. 211) .
23. Other important links are technology transfer and skill upgrading (Le., labor mobility). Backward linkages, however, are probably the most important because they can become the vehicle for technology transfer and skill upgrading.
24. Moreover, for U.S. corporations-the principal participants in the global assembly industry-the U.S. tariff items 806/807 provide added incentive to use U.S. components, since local components would be taxed upon entry into the U.S. 25. These figures include sales from other firms within export processing zones as domes tic contento 26. Malaysia's proportion of domestic inputs (other than capital goods) in its assembly industry stayed very low, between 3 and 6 percent from 1974 to 1978, although the percentage of local capital goods (excluding construction) increased from 16 percent to 21 percent over the same years. Spinanger suggests that this rise reflects the increasing purchases of local dyeing machines by textile manufacturers, who are largely local (p. 79).
27. For complex integrated circuits, only 4 percent of entire cost is assembly (Currie, p. 21) .
28. Particularly in textiles and clothing, firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea have been investing heavily in overseas assembly, especially Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, China, Sri Lanka, and most recently the Caribbean. Quota restrictions in the U.S. and rising wages at home have been the primary motivations.
29. Even in the Shannon region of Ireland, Sklair finds most foreign-owned firms buying few local inputs, despite vigorous efforts by the development authorities to foster local sourcing.
Nevertheless, Sklair rates the Shannon experience more highly in terms of technology transfer and local skills upgrading, due largely to the local R&D of some of the foreign firms and the resulting growth of local value added (Sklair, 1988) .
30. By 1983, Taiwan's science park near Taipei had thirty firms, with another twelve under construction (Spinanger, p. 78) .
31. Korea, for example, has generally kept foreign direct investment to under 10 percent of total long-term credit (Fajnzylber, p. 122) .
32. Partly as a buffer or transition zone from this capitalist bulwark (which China is due to incorpora te in 1997), and partly to take advantage of the infrastructure, demand, skills, and capital in Hong Kong, the government set up the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on the Hong Kong border in 1979.
33. The tax incentives offered in President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative starting in 1984 were more liberal than existing U.S. Tariff Items 806/807 (Bennett, 1987, p. 25) . Also the Twin Plant provision allowed U.S. firms doing assembly in Caribbean countries to repatriate their profits tax-free if they had a twin plant in Puerto Rico (and if the host country had signed a tax information exchange agreement with the IRS to monitor drug money flows).
34. Korean corporations have created a negative public image for themselves in the Caribbean, however, because of the way they treat workers. 36. There are several danger signs that Mexico's governrnent will have to heed along the route to export-led industrialization: foreign debt, political unrest, labor unrest, and labor scarcity. With respect to the intractable foreign debt problern, Mexico seerns to be rnaking sorne headway in negotiations, as the U.S. recognizes its own interest in reducing the debt.
With respect to political unrest, in Mexico-as in the Asian tigers-the governrnent can no longer keep a tight lid on popular political expression.
Rather than cracking, however, the governrnent is showing resiliency by recognizing opposition gains in the presidential election, allowing an opposition victory at the state leve!, and defusing opposition in local elections by substituting nonpartisan neighborhood-based electoral battles for party battles. Concerning labor unrest, the governrnent has had arnazing success so far in lowering real wage levels since 1982 without provoking threatening upheavals. With regard to labor scarcity, however, Mexico rnay face a new turn of events. If Mexican labor sees formal channels for wage dernands as useless, it still has options: rnigrate to the U.S. or withdraw frorn the labor force. This latter option is a latent threat to the assernbly industry, which is still largely a fernale labor force. If austerity rneasures rnake daily life too costly and assernbly wages do not irnprove, rnaquiladora workers rnay find farnily survival requires thern to return to unpaid labor in the horne to try to reduce the cost of living for the farnily.
37. The rise of the New Directions rnovernent in the United Auto Workers is a direct expression of this resistance.
38. This observation carne frorn Tchen Tchiang, a Taiwanese doctoral student who is doing a cornparison of the assernbly industry in Taiwan and Mexico for his dissertation at the University of Texas.
